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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political, organizational and cultural barriers to the 
implementation of the U.S. Defense Resource Management Model (DRMM) decision 
support system by the Ministry of Defense in Hungary between 1995 and 2000. It 
surveys the heritage of the Warsaw Pact alliance on military planning in Hungary prior to 
1989. A detailed description of the DRMM system is provided along with an 
implementation history of DRMM in Hungary. Factors in the implementation failure are 
examined and suggestions are offered for improving the management of software and 
systems implementation in the future. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       BACKGROUND 
In 1995 the Hungarian Defense Forces, as well as some other independent 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, started to implement the Defense Resource 
Management Model (DRMM) developed especially for those countries by a U.S.DoD 
team. The DRMM is a universal tool, which can perform the following main functions: 
• By using the data of existing forces, the DRMM can determine their 
capability 
• Using a complex set data about the particular country, including 
geopolitical, political and economical factors and the estimated threat from 
the neighborhood, the DRMM can determine the required defense 
capabilities and size of the required forces 
• DRMM can also provide the capability to analyze assets a comparison of 
assets and cost analyses 
The initial implementation of the DRMM in Hungary began with U.S. assistance 
and a high level of cooperation and enthusiasm on both sides. A special Implementation 
Department was established at the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (MOD) with all the 
necessary facilities and equipment. There was a five-month training program for the 
personnel and also courses for high-ranking military and civilian officials. Yet even 
though the designers had offered theoretically excellent software, some difficulties 
emerged during the implementation process. Cooperation gradually slowed down and 
then stopped completely in 1997. The organization was abolished and the DRMM was 
transferred to a lower level department in the General Staff. In 1998, there was another 
attempt from the United States to implement the methodology and the tool in the ongoing 
reorganization of Hungarian Defense Forces. Unfortunately, meetings were formal and 
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could not resolve the problems. Since senior and middle management support was absent, 
the DRMM implementation team was disbanded in 2001 and the intent of using the tool 
for defense management vanished. 
If defense resource management continues to operate in the old paper-based, 
manual way, the new democratic countries cannot comply with the requirements of 
NATO, and the Partnership for Peace initiatives. The decision-making process remains 
bureaucratic and inertial, which will negatively affect the realization of military projects 
and combat readiness. Furthermore, the significant U.S. financial aid to those countries 
will be spent inefficiently and the goals will not be reached. 
Even though the designer group did an excellent job, the product has a somewhat 
synthetic way of approaching the military planning process. This thesis will investigate 
the possibilities for further improving the tool, especially regarding sensitivity to the local 
historical and cultural environment. On the other hand, the thesis will identify the 
misleading factors inside the environment of the implementation and will suggest ways to 
reduce the influence of those factors. 
B.        PURPOSE 
The study supports the goals of NATO and the Partnership for Peace Initiative. 
The purpose of this thesis is to improve the efficiency of foreign aid directed at the 
reorganization of the armed forces in the emerging new democratic countries. 
The study will use the implementation of the Defense Resource Management 
Model (DRMM) in the Hungarian Defense Forces as an example. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.        Primary Research Questions 
What difficulties emerged during the DRMM implementation process in 
Hungary? 
What were the reasons for these difficulties? 
How might they be avoided in future implementations? 
Secondary Research Questions 
What is the purpose of using Information Technology for military resource 
management? 
What are the necessary conditions for implementation? 
What were the mistakes in the American and Hungarian approach to the 
DRMM implementation? 
What are the primary lessons learned? 
What are the recommendations for subsequent implementation of the 
DRMM? 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
The author of this thesis was a member of the Hungarian DRMM implementation 
team. As a former team member, he has experimental data about the Hungarian 
implementation process. 
In addition to personal experience, other sources are available such as 
interviewing former group members, and keeping in contact with the design group in 
Washington D.C. 
The third source of the information is the official Web page of the design group. 
This page, besides providing an updated version of software, offers the annual reports of 
the member countries and their speeches of annual meetings. 
The analyses will be conducted in three steps: 
First, the goals of the designers need to be clarified as well as determined the need 
of willingness of the user to deploy the software. 
Secondly, the discrepancies between the goals of designers and the needs of users 
must be identified. 
Thirdly, those cases where the goals of designers and the needs of users were 
consistent need to be examined. Nevertheless the implementation still faced major 
obstacles. Using the Roberts' Organizational Systems Framework, the thesis is explores 
the reasons of the unsuccessful outcome. If the strategic goals of the implementation do 
not meet the requirements of the users, or the users cannot accept the offered solution, the 
thesis provides a feasible suggestion to the designers. 
E.        ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter I introduces the reader with the background of the thesis. These chapter 
gives explanation of the Purpose and lists the primary and secondary Research Questions 
At the end of this part the reader finds information about the methods and procedures 
used to conduct the thesis. 
Chapter II gives an insight to the to the history of military planning process in 
Hungary and the challenge of reorganizing its armed forces. 
Chapter El describes the emerged necessity of implementing the Information 
Technology and gives introduction to the Defense Resource Management Model 
(DRMM). Finally this chapter introduces the reader to the U.S-Hungarian Cooperation 
for Implementing the DRMM 
Chapter IV shows the different views and approaches to the implementation of the 
American design group and the Hungarian implementation team. 
This chapter lists the difficulties and obstacles that emerged during the 
implementation process and also describes the Hungarian DRMM implementation 
process presently. 
Chapter V gives analyses of the problem and shows, how does Information 
Technology affect organizations. Identifying the reasons and factors, which created the 
major obstacles, the chapter presents possible solutions to the problem. 
Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions and lessons learned implementing the 
Defense Resource Management Model in the Hungarian Armed Forces. In this chapter 
the thesis suggests what should be done to avoid this situation in the future. At the end of 
the thesis Chapter VI gives summary of responses to the Research Questions. 
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II.      HISTORY OF HUNGARY WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MILITARY PLANNING 
PROCESS IN HUNGARY AND THE CHALLENGE OF REORGANIZING 
ITS ARMED FORCES 
Long before the Warsaw Pact was established, the Soviet Union had molded the 
East European states into an alliance serving its security interests. While liberating 
Eastern Europe from Nazi Germany in World War II, the Red Army established political 
and military control over that region. The Soviet Union intended to use Eastern Europe as 
a buffer zone for the forward defense of its western borders and to keep threatening 
ideological influences at bay. In the hierarchy of Soviet security priorities, continued 
control of Eastern Europe was second only to the defense of its homeland. The allied 
national formations were directly subordinate to the headquarters of the Soviet Union's 
Supreme High Command and its executive body, the General Staff of the Armed Forces. 
Although the Soviet Union directly commanded all allied units, the Supreme High 
Command included one representative from each of the East European forces. Lacking 
authority, these representatives simply relayed directives from the Supreme High 
Command and General Staff to the commanders of the East European units. 
The political and military alliance of the Soviet Union and East European socialist 
states, known as the Warsaw Pact, was formed in 1955 as a counterweight to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created in 1949. Seemingly, the alliance served 
peaceful international purposes and the common security of its participants. According to 
the Warsaw Pact Charter, signed by the allies on May 1,1955, 
The contracting parties reaffirming their desire for the organization of a 
system of collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the 
European states, irrespective of their social and state systems.1 
In fact the Warsaw Pact was established to serve pure Soviet security interests, 
using geopolitical advantages and military resources of previously occupied and 
politically subordinated countries. Consequently, the political leadership and the military 
command structure of the Warsaw Pact were based on the unconditional reliance of the 
allied states and the full execution of Soviet political will. 
The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, in the spirit of 
sincere cooperation, in all international undertakings intended to safeguard 
international peace and security, and they shall use all their energies for 
the realization of these aims.2 
In this article of the Charter there is a slightly concealed allusion, which can 
explain the essence of the military planning principles and procedures in the Warsaw 
Pact. The allies had to use their resources and energies to fulfill the Soviet requirements. 
The allied states did not even have a tangible defense budget. Fulfilling Soviet-designed 
defense requirements had taken complete priority over all other national interests. The 
requirements of the Warsaw Pact Military were designed in Moscow, and the approval 
process of the projects was quite formal which excluded any significant influence from 
allied representatives. Consequently, the Hungarian People's Army3 management had no 
particular defense planning system or procedure until the early 1990's, 
In Hungary, at the end of the 1980's, the old political structure approached its 
final years of existence. Leaders of the country recognized that further political and 
1
 Warsaw Pact Charter (Modem History Sourcebook). 
2
 Warsaw Pact Charter, Article 2. (Modern History Sourcebook). 
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economical isolation could bring tragic consequences to the nation. They understood that 
the further rejection of trade limitations and advanced technology would gradually 
debilitate the economy, which would undermine the remaining political power. The 
communist leadership was intent on stabilizing its political power by improving the 
socialist system. Nobody could have ever predicted the rapid and fundamental changes 
that occurred in such a short period of time and which would change the political map of 
Europe as well as the entire world order. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the 
former allied states faced an entirely new external and internal situation. Hungary finally 
obtained full independence, which had not happened, since the 16th century and then was 
abandoned by both world powers and its former allies. 
Before this vast political transition, the Hungarian armed forces as part of the 
Warsaw Pact, had limited responsibility and was subordinate to Soviet command and the 
communist party. The unexpected and swift political changes had completely confused 
and shaken all the military. This confusion and uncertainty generated a period of 
upheaval. A large part of the younger and well-educated personnel left the forces 
immediately and found jobs in the prospering civilian sector, while the oldest officers 
opted for early retirement. The remaining commanding staff, characterized by outdated 
skills and education and antiquated political convictions, tried to adapt. 
It was evident to everybody that the new political structure had to reshape the 
armed forces. The Warsaw Pact member, the Hungarian People's Army, was not 
3
 The official name of the Hungarian military forces subordinated to the Warsaw Pact. 
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prepared for the circular defense, and even lacked a doctrine or military strategy. Owing 
to the human resource problem described above, some experts advocated retiring the 
entire armed forces and creating an entirely new system, but nobody would assume the 
responsibility for such a radical decision. Furthermore, the inherited downward-spiraling 
economy and the colossal national debt made any drastic steps impossible. In addition to 
that, many feared the old-style military power and the possibility of rebellion. At that 
point, a long lasting metamorphosis of the armed forces began and continues today. 
The termination of the Warsaw Pact allowed the country to express its historical 
desire to reestablish its European political, economical and cultural society. The 
formidable barriers that had inhibited this dream for so long finally collapsed. Hungary 
announced its willingness to join the European Union and NATO and headed toward a 
market economy. 
The West-European and NATO member countries appreciated the Hungarian 
efforts and implemented several projects to help the new democratic country to regain its 
historical place in Europe and in the world at large. 
B.        DEVELOPING A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO;  SPONSORSHIP OF 
UNITED STATES 
Since 1989, Hungary has sought to become more closely integrated with Western 
European institutions. Hungary signed on to NATO's Partnership for Peace on February 
8, 1994, and approved an individual partnership program on November 15, 1994. Since 
December of 1995, Hungary has leased a military base in Taszar, in southern Hungary to 
U.S.  troops serving in Bosnia.  In addition,  a Hungarian engineering battalion is 
participating in NATO's Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia. Some surveillance 
aircraft operating in aerial verification missions over Kosovo are based at Taszär. 
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In December of 1998, parliament failed to pass by a two-third majority a 
constitutional amendment that would have increased the government's powers to approve 
the deployment of Hungarian troops abroad or the stationing of foreign troops in 
Hungary. The government had pledged to revisit this issue in 1999. In accession 
negotiations with NATO in late 1997, Hungary agreed to contribute 0.65% of the 
alliance's common budget. Hungary has pledged to increase its defense budget by about 
0.1 % of the GDP per year over the next 4 to 5 years. In July of 1997, the government 
announced its intention to hold a national referendum on joining NATO in November 
1997. On November 16 with just under a 50% turnout, about 85% of participants cast 
ballots in favor of NATO membership. In February 1999, parliament ratified the North 
Atlantic Treaty. On March 12, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became 
members of the NATO alliance. Hungary has since supported NATO's air campaign 
against Yugoslavia. The government and parliament have approved NATO's use of its 
airfields, in addition to its airspace. With other countries, Hungary opened accession 
negotiations with the European Union in March 1998. 
Since the democratic revolutions in 1989, U.S. administrations have advanced 
relations with the region. Governmental and private contacts, programs and investments 
with central European countries have expanded considerably. U.S. assistance programs to 
central Europe continue to emphasize economic growth, democracy and quality of life. 
The United States' relations with Hungary improved consistently in the 1980s. 
The Bush administration launched an extensive U.S. aid program for Hungary in July of 
1989, which emphasized private sector development and promotion of trade and 
investment. A Hungarian-American Enterprise Found was established in 1990. Hungary 
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has become eligible for the General System of Preferences (GSP) and Overseas Private 
investment Corporation (OPIC) benefits, and as of April 1992, has received 
unconditional Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. Hungary has received substantial 
economic assistance under the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act, 
totaling over $240 million through fiscal year 1998. In the private sector, the United 
States has the highest level of foreign investment in Hungary. 4 
Hungary has also received U.S. security assistance in the form of grants, loans 
and military training. Among those, the United States government established a 
foundation called International Military Educational Training (IMET), which provides 
the opportunity for the military personnel to acquire high-level Western-style military 
education. American and British advisors are working with the Hungarian military to 
rewrite its doctrine according to Western models to harmonize its plans and its strategy 
with NATO's goals. 
4
 Julie Kim, "Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic: Recent Developments" (CBS Issue Brief for 
Congress 1999). 
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III.    THE DRMM 
A.       THE      EMERGED      NECESSITY      OF      IMPLEMENTING      THE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Under Soviet control it was commonly known that information was power, so it 
did not belong equally to everyone. The information systems were kept under 
government control and the civilian population had very limited access. For example, 
average citizens in Hungary had to wait up to 20-25 years for private telephone access. 
Usually, the high-level technology was implemented in the military prior to the 
civilian sector. In Hungary this happened in the opposite way. In the newborn private 
sector, an urgent need for the new technology emerged to keep up with international 
competition. The old communist management had to move forward to relax rigid 
restrictions in trade and encourage the implementation of advanced technology. The 
technical intelligentsia worked to diffuse up-to-date technology, sometimes even 
illegally. Certain high-tech systems and equipment were unavailable to the Eastern 
countries, or had been under customs restrictions or the Coordinating Committee for 
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). In the military, data processing was done 
manually in the Soviet-inherited bureaucratic system. The advanced IT was available 
only for the top-level military management, and mostly for their personal matters. In the 
middle of the 1990's in the civilian area, there was accessible up-to-date technology on 
the market shelf, while the military personnel were still working with dated equipment. 
Under these conditions Hungary was faced with reorganizing its defense forces 
and preparing for NATO accession. Without a functioning communication system that is 
secure  and  efficient,  data  collecting  and  processing  systems,  the  possibility for 
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cooperation with military allies is nonexistent. Both America and Hungary recognized 
this key point at the very early stages of negotiations. 
B.        INTRODUCTION   TO   THE   DEFENSE  RESOURCE  MANAGEMENT 
MODEL 
1. Basic Information about DRMM 
One of the important goals for the reorganization was implementing the Defense 
Resource Management Model (DRMM) Information Technology system. The DRMM is 
designed to be an analytical tool used by high-level military and civilian planners in the 
macro analysis of a given country's defense system. It is a computer model based on US 
defense planning practices. The DRMM integrates force capability and cost assessment 
data into a single model to compare various tradeoffs between force structure 
alternatives. Planners can create and modify the model's fundamental characteristics to 
include force structure, equipment levels, manning, peacetime training, wartime 
stockpiles, and fiscal management practices. 
The model produces both tabular and graphic outputs that quantify a country's 
force capabilities. They can be compared to alternative force structures and compared to 
the capability of a national opposing or comparative force. Moreover, the DRMM 
contains integrated force capability assessment and cost analysis modules that help to 
model the benefits of different force programs. The information provided by the model 
can assist defense managers in deciding between alternatives. See Figure 1. 
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1. MOD / GS provide 
•general guidance 
•detailed cost and force data 
2. DRMS Office enters 
data into theDRMM. 
6. MOD / GS makes 
alternate plans; 
Repeats' the process. 
NO Risk acceptable? 
Costs acceptable? 
5. MOD / GS make 
judgments based ou all 
available information. 
4. DRMS office analyzes and 
interprets model output, presents 
_       combined cost and capability 
1
 ■*LJ*    assessments to MOD / GS. 
} 3. Model stores combined data, runs calculations, and produces output. 
Possible Proposal 
Figure 1. How DRMM is Used. 
The DRMM is designed to: 
• Help civilian defense and military officials develop cost-constrained, 
cost-effective defense programs 
• Familiarize officials with U.S. Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS) techniques and methodology 
• Provide military and civilian leaders with a model to use in planning for 
national defense 
• Help to balance national defense expenditures against economic and 
political reforms and assist countries in providing for their defense 
requirements during a period of severely constrained budgets 
The DRMM operates on any IBM-compatible personal computer in the Windows 
environment.  Developed using the Microsoft  Visual FoxPro database management 
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system, the DRMM stores tens of thousands of data elements representing key 
characteristics of any given national military force structure. The DRMM is a completely 
self-contained run-time module. Users do not need Microsoft FoxPro to use it. 
2. Data Requirements 
The DRMM is a data model consisting of four types of data: 
• Force setup 
• Cost setup 
• Force (or unit) 
• Cost factors 
a. Force Setup 
Force setup consists of qualitative information, such as the universal set of 
weapons types, war reserve materiel types, personnel types, and critical unit 
characteristics to be used in the model. Force setup also includes limited calculation 
factors, such as the range of possible unit mobilization times. The setup data serves as the 
building blocks or reference lists of information that will be used to assign characteristics 
to specific units or whole force structures to and includes the Opposing 
Force/Comparison Force. Matching specific unit information with force setup data 
creates force (or unit) data. See Figure 2. 
b. Cost Setup 
Cost setup data or first level data defines country-specific currencies, cost 
accounts, budget categories, project names, inflation factors, and unit types. The second 
level of data is the Cost Factors for personnel, equipment operating, unit operating, 
equipment procurement, and project costs. These can be defined as either "actual" costs 
based on historical pricing or "standard" costs from engineering or financially calculated 
16 
Standards. Also at this level, resources or funding factors can be applied to the individual 
cost factors. Inflation rates are also found at this level. 
DRMM Force Data Structure 
3 Levels 



















Base Case Force 
Alternative 1 




Figure 2. DRMM Force Data Structure. 
The model uses setup data to facilitate the user's entry of force data and 
cost factors. In the DRMM, there will be only one combined force-cost body of setup 
data, which remains constant for all alternative force structures modeled. Conversely, 
there will be as many combined sets of force or unit data and cost factors as force 
structure alternatives entered into the model. The differences are in the multiple force and 
cost data sets, particularly in quantities for uniquely defined alternatives. The following 
paragraphs will explain each of the four categories of data in detail. 
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3. Limitations of the Model 
The DRMM uses an equipment scoring methodology to measure the static combat 
capability of a described force. The DRMM makes static comparisons of alternative force 
structures and therefore does not predict a battle outcome. The DRMM is not a force-cost 
optimization model, nor is it a war game. The DRMM will not tell users how best to 
allocate resources to "win" a conflict. The model does not factor into its capability 
calculations of non-lethal contributions such as: command, control, communication, 
computer and information (C4I), electronic warfare, psychological operations, target 
acquisition, transportation etc. Also, the DRMM does not adequately measure the 
contributions to force capability of light forces, such as infantry. The DRMM is not 
intended to replace military judgment. It does not provide the best alternative or a definite 
answer.  It is merely a tool to  support decision-makers,  and not a substitute for 
experienced military judgment. 
4. Model Output 
The DRMM provides two forms of output: tabular reports and graphs. These 
forms of output have been designed to facilitate review of force structure data for errors 
and to support analysis and assessment of force structures. Both forms can be generated 
for a wide variety of force structures and cost information, depending upon the selections 
made by the user. 
5. Defense Resource Management Model Components 
The DRMM is used to store data, which represent the key cost and force 
characteristics of a national military force structure. There are two major components of 
the DRMM: the force module and the cost module. 
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a.        Force Module 
Within the force module, the DRMM focuses on four major areas: units, 
equipment, personnel, and resources. These four areas are briefly described below. 
(1) Units. The force structure is described at the unit level and 
at a level of detail determined by a user. Force and cost data can be reflected at the 
regiment and/or separate battalion level, whereas the organization of some countries' 
armed forces may dictate that force and cost data be maintained at a lower echelon, e.g. 
company. In addition to describing a country's own armed forces structure, an opposing 
force (threat) or comparison force structure can be developed for use in comparing the 
relative combat capability of the two forces. In cases where the description of a realistic 
opposing force is too politically sensitive, this capability can be used to measure regional 
parity between neighboring countries or a comparative national force. This capability 
allows for the comparison of trends in combat capability between alternative force 
structures and is not intended to predict battle outcome. The model can generate a 
"buildup graph" of selected forces, reflecting the readiness level, training time, and travel 
time under a defined scenario. 
(2) Equipment.  The equipment inventory of a country's force 
structure and its associated activity level is entered in the DRMM at the level of major 
item of equipment. The DRMM uses a weapon system scoring methodology that assigns 
a numerical value to the major combat systems, such as tanks, APCs and artillery, in the 
inventory. The combat power of a force is computed by aggregating the total weapon 
systems scores for all equipment in the selected unit's inventory. This score represents a 
static measure of the combat capability of a force. However, it is not a war game and it 
does not predict the outcome of a conflict. Although equipment, such as trucks and other 
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non-firepower related items, should be entered in the model for costing and training 
purposes, these equipment items do not receive a combat capability score. The model 
produces the combat capability output in five different levels: Authorized, Actual, 
Mission Capable, Effective, and Training. The model also allows a user to show degraded 
combat capability due to reduced equipment on hand, equipment under repair, lack of 
training on equipment, and lack of resources to use the equipment fully. The associated 
activity level of the equipment allows the model to calculate unit operating costs and a 
rough measure of unit training levels. See Figure 3. 
Unit Equipment Information 
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Figure 3. Unit Equipment Information. 
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(3) Personnel. The DRMM accounts for personnel at the unit 
level. Personnel quantities are entered at the unit level based on Personnel Types. 
Personnel Types must be agreed upon by both the force team members and the cost team 
members so that personnel quantity data reflected at the unit level are compatible with the 
personnel budget accounts. 
(4) Resources. The DRMM accounts for user-defined 
resources, sometimes called war-reserve materiel, at the unit level. A user defines the 
types of resources included in the model in the Forces Setup files. Typically, ammunition 
and POL are the two major resource types tracked in the DRMM but resource categories 
of spare parts, crews, and food, could also be defined. The required and actual quantities 
of a defined resource are entered in the DRMM at the unit level. The DRMM also 
includes a function to allocate resources from a higher level to a lower level, for example 
from brigade or depot to battalion if actual quantities exceed required quantities at the 
brigade level and a shortage of the same resource exists at the battalion level. Resource 
Types also can be categorized to cause degradation in combat capability (the "effective" 
score) if resource deficiencies exist. See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Unit Resources Information. 
b. Cost Module 
The cost module defines peacetime operating costs of a country's defense 
program in the four major areas of defense resource management: force structure costs; 
readiness costs; investment costs and sustainability costs. The DRMM also incorporates 
inflation rates so that these costs can be viewed in terms of their escalated values in future 
years. In practice, the DRMM advocates a unit-based costing approach where the above 
costs are associated as much as possible with specific units. In this manner, the DRMM 
approach builds the costs from the bottom up as opposed to a top down allocation 
approach historically used by many countries. 
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The DRMM costing approach is also one of decision support rather than 
decision-making. The DRMM does not attempt to optimize resource allocation. Rather, 
the DRMM allows a user to develop likely alternatives whose effects on costs can then be 
analyzed and evaluated. This approach facilitates the force and cost analysts to be more 
intimately involved in the modeling effort than one in which the model dictates a 
solution. 
6. DRMM Analytical Methodology 
a. "Base Year" and "Base Case" Force 
The first step in the basic DRMM methodology is to describe the Base 
year force. The Base year force is also the first year of the Base case force and generally 
reflects the most recent year that force structure and budget data are available. Once the 
Base year force data, including units, personnel, equipment, with associated activity 
levels, resources and all associated cost factors are entered in the DRMM, the data is 
copied for the number of years to be reflected in the Base case time period, which should 
correspond to the defense planning cycle. Then, approved or programmed changes in the 
force structure, personnel levels, equipment modernization, or resource levels beyond the 
Base year are entered in the model. This constitutes the Base case force. 
The base case is a multiyear snapshot of the officially approved current 
and future force. The base case provides a reference point for documenting the 
capabilities and costs associated with a country's approved military program in the 
current and future fiscal years. Once the base case, including out-years, is established, 
alternative force structures can be developed and compared with the base case's aggregate 
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Figure 5. Model Methodologies. 
b. Analyzing the Base Case and Developing Alternatives 
The analysis of the Base case focuses on identifying problem areas for 
redress. These areas may be examined in detail in alternative force posture. The cost 
implications of the Base case and force ratios between the Base case force and an 
Opposing Force if applicable, are examined to determine the credibility of the Base case 
force. If deficiencies are identified in force capability (unfavorable force ratios), 
sustainability (resource shortages), or readiness (inadequate personnel or training levels), 
then a new alternative can be developed to redress the shortfalls or the decision made to 
accept more risk in the Base case force. Alternative program structures might examine 
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force restructuring, equipment modernization, resource levels, personnel realignments, or 
reallocation of financial resources between different areas of the budget. It may be 
necessary to examine more than one alternative force structure in order to develop a 
budget-constrained but effective force structure within the parameters of political 
guidance and budget realities. 
C.       U.S.-HUNGARIAN    COOPERATION    FOR    IMPLEMENTING    THE 
DRMM 
On October 26. 1993, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy of the United 
States Department of Defense requested the Directorate for Program, Analysis and 
Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a program for the 
emerging democracies of Central Europe to help civilian defense and military officials 
develop defense programs. 
In 1995, the Hungarian Defense Forces accepted the United States' offer to 
implement the Defense Resource Management Model and the parties signed a high-level 
agreement for future collaboration. 
The cooperation started with enthusiasm. The Hungarian Ministry of Defense 
established an independent department with three sections lead by a colonel, directly 
subordinate to the Chief of Staff. The department consisted of officers and experts with 
different backgrounds: Army, Air Force, economy, acquisition and finance. The group 
had a supplemental budget to acquire the necessary hardware, furniture, cars, and 
consuming materials. The work began with the educational phase. A mobile team of 
DRMM experts from the U.S. DoD Directorate for Program, Analysis and Evaluation 
held a five month training session for the Hungarian personnel. During the course of the 
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Defense Resources Management Studies, joint teams representing the U.S. and Hungary, 
employed the DRMM as their primary analytic tool. 
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IV.    DRMM IMPLEMENTATION 
A. DIFFERENT VIEWS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
The Hungarian military leadership appreciated American assistance and 
accommodated the DRMM implementation process. However, since this leadership was 
unfamiliar with the principles and methodology of American defense planning procedure 
(PPBS), the expectations were not realistic. Overvaluing the role of the DRMM and 
Information Technology, some Hungarian leaders looked at the program as a magic tool, 
which could quickly and easily solve the whole transition and make the overall 
Hungarian military system compatible with NATO. 
The American experts had a somewhat simplistic approach to the DRMM 
implementation. The linear thinking and perceptions of the group members, being 
colored by their roots in American culture and education, could not recognize the 
complexity of the Hungarian military environment. The software designers did not realize 
that the PPBS was designed to fulfill U.S. military requirements inside the United States, 
based on U.S. society, tradition and culture. 
B. DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES THAT EMERGED DURING THE 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
The first difficulties appeared upon entering the basic data. It became clear that 
the existing data collected using the old bureaucratic methods was not precise enough and 
contained several confusing elements. The first phase of the armed forces' reduction was 
under way. Some bases had just been closed, renamed or redeployed. Meanwhile, the 
reporting system underwent a capital reorganization. Some units reported using the old 
system while others used the new one. Sometimes the different organizations provided 
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reports simultaneously about the same objectives, and yet the data were entirely different. 
The old data were mixed with new data. Often the units did not report data at all. The 
Hungarian team members tried to overcome the obstacles, but the group, being in a 
temporary legal status, lacked the authority to change the bureaucratic system. Some 
experts suggested improvements to the bureaucracy to make the system more applicable 
for the computerization. Due to the lack of Information Technology knowledge and 
awareness by the leadership, these ideas were rejected. 
The American side had a quite different approach. The team members looked at 
the implementation process as an experimental launch of their software, and viewed the 
Hungarian military as an ideal environment for this experiment. When they recognized 
the malfunctions, they tried to fix them by changing the software design. The experts 
made several improvements to the program without any significant results. Having only a 
general knowledge of the Hungarian military bureaucracy, the American specialists did 
not understand the essence of the problem. 
The joint team made an enormous effort to overcome these difficulties on both 
sides, but it could not gain the desired result. The Hungarian military leadership did not 
recognize the importance of the required changes. The middle level leaders did not even 
understand the need to create a resource allocation and defense planning system because 
the Hungarian People's army did not have one during the Warsaw Pact era. Later, when 
certain high-ranking military officials became familiar with the program, they recognized 
its advantages but realized the program could threaten them. The program was too 
precise, and its implementation would have made managing the military by the previous 
methods impossible. They knew that they could not work with this program due to their 
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old-style education. Consequently, they strongly opposed the implementation of the 
DRMM. 
During the bilateral cooperation the top management seemingly showed interest 
in the DRMM, but later put it aside. In the fall of 1997, during the last reorganization 
period of the armed forces, the DRMM department was abolished. The program and the 
assets were moved into a little section, subordinate to the Defense Planning Directorate of 
the General Staff. However, this section, named the "Defense Resource Analyses Group" 
had an entirely different assignment and did not have the ability to deal with the Defense 
Resource Management Model. 
In addition, the transition of the DRMM issue to a lower level, generated legal 
and organizational difficulties. The Defense Resource Analyses Group in its first annual 
report in December 1997 highlighted: 
At the end we have to report a significant problem: However the DRMM 
team in its current position and form is able to support certain defense 
planning functions for the Defense Planning Directorate, it cannot perform 
the whole Defense Resource Management support. The Analyses Group 
has no legal access to information concerning the Ministry of Defense and 
its agencies, because the group is located at a lower level of command- 
and-control hierarchy.5 
This demonstrates that the DRMM issue probably had been placed intentionally 
on the margins of Defense Resource Management. Meanwhile, at the Ministry of 
Defense, a new Defense Planning Directorate had been created with the goal to design a 
new Hungarian Defense Resource Management System (VTR). The new system was 
5
 Report of Performed Duties and Experiences - Defense Resource Analyzes Group 1997 Budapest 
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drafted without any involvement of the DRMM team. The approval process of the VTR 
is still underway. 
C.        THE DRMM PROCESS PRESENTLY 
In the spring of 1998, the United States once again attempted to implement the 
methodology in the ongoing reorganization of the Hungarian Defense Forces. A mobile 
team of the software design group visited Hungary monthly between January and June. 
At that time, the situation in the Balkans and the European security issues significantly 
accelerated the negotiations between NATO and the invited countries of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. The NATO enlargement had been considered a reality in 
the near future. The DRMM experts presented a new NATO compatible version of the 
software to meet the new requirements. 
By the time the defense planners in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense rejected 
the DRMM, however, this silent decision was not announced officially. Unfortunately, 
meetings could not resolve the problems. The DRMM implementation has failed because 
the desire to use the type of resource management that DRMM supports was not backed 
at the highest levels of the organization. 
As a result of the absence of senior and middle management support, the DRMM 
implementation team was disbanded in 2001. 
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V.      ANALYSIS 
A.        ANALYSES 
1.        The Information Revolution 
Globalization is one of the dominating paradigms of the international strategic 
planning process. Ten years ago, it still seemed irrelevant to the operations of most 
organizations. Today, it is not fiction anymore, and it is an exciting reality for those who 
take advantage of it and a harsh lesson for those who do not. The past fifty years have 
meant  fundamental  and rapid transformations  of society due to the advances in 
Information Technology. Until fairly recently, however, human interaction was spatially 
dependent, meaning that in order for people to interact, they all had to be in the same 
place at the same time. During this period, remote interaction and messaging systems 
were prohibitively expensive, inaccurate, inefficient, or some combination of all of these 
factors. Only in the past few years have technologies, such as electronic mail, fax 
transmission and computer networking become effective and affordable to the extent that 
at least some of them can be found almost at every business. Practically every 
governmental organization uses Information Technology, where the term Information 
Technology really did not exist until after 1980. What is so surprising is the rate at which 
Information Technology has become integrated into the lives of IT users. They are now 
as significant and valuable as the telephone and postal system, perhaps even more so. 
Information Technology is creeping into every aspect of human life and into every aspect 
of corporate life. 
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Nevertheless, technology has also proved to be costly and harmful for those who 
failed to use it properly and to integrate it with all the other building blocks of their 
organizational structure. Lack of knowledge and experience with the electronic mediums 
has often created the greatest problems. Therefore, Information Technology (IT) 
integration in the corporate environment is not only an issue of cables, numbers and 
connections. It is also a human issue. It influences the corporate culture of corporations 
all too often when it should instead be tailored to that organizational culture.6 
However, we have to assess to what extent IT influences, if it does, corporate 
culture, organizational structure, and the way people interact in the workplace. 
2. How Does IT Affect Organizations? 
The influence of IT organization and their functioning of organizations and the 
likely changes created in the behavior, structure and culture of the workforce was 
analyzed. These generalizations reach across cultural boundaries, although, some are 
more or less prevalent according to cultural norms. 
a. Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure is likely to be the variable that will be the most 
affected by the appearance of IT. Introducing IT significantly rearranges the workplace. 
Employees previously had to be in close proximity to each other to be able to work 
together efficiently. Today the face-to-face contact is seldom required-and employees that 
are separated by long distance can afford to collaborate at low cost using IT. 
One factor concerns the structure of the workplace: The form of most 
organizations at present has been dictated by the constraints of a non-electronic world. 
6
 Dr. Caren Siehl, Lecture (at the American Graduate School of International Management 1995.) 
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Formal command structures had to specify who assigned tasks to whom, who reported to 
whom and who was allowed access to what information. These constraints reinforced the 
centralization of information and shaped the number of organizational levels, the amount 
of interConnectivity, the degree of information sharing and the structure of social 
relationships. 
In the Taylor model, the relationship between operators and information 
systems was relatively simple: The workers received and sorted information but only had 
at their disposal that information that was deemed necessary for them to perform assigned 
tasks. It was a one-way communication and little or no feedback was possible from the 
operator to the originator of the information by the means of IT. They only played a 
passive role within the information system since a segmented and hierarchical division of 
information existed. 
At present, and potentially in the future, organizations that incorporate 
Information Technology successfully are becoming more flexible and less hierarchical in 
structure. In the successful implementation of IT, the worker is changing from being a 
passive figure to an active one, in that more information than previously supplied by the 
system must be asked for by the former. The worker must also supply the system with 
information that adapts the IT structure to this reality. The change in the worker's role 
poses the problem of possible access to information. To supply information and facilitate 
access to the IT, organizations must lower entry thresholds and multiply ways of access 
and de-centralize its point of contact with the users. It has also proven to be necessary to 
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remove bureaucratic impediments such as long hierarchical chains and the rigid division 
of responsibility that often obstructs channels of communication. 7 
"Information Technology should enhance, not obscure what is done in the 
company." 
(Sculley, 1995) 
Within the corporate culture, this changing mindset has manifested itself 
as a re-evaluation of traditional roles of various individuals within the organization's 
structure. Traditionally, computer operators have been at the low end. Their duties and 
responsibilities   were  generally  neither  impressive  nor  interesting.   More  recently, 
however, companies have begun to realize that these individuals represent a potentially 
valuable resource.8 
b.        How National Cultures Influence the Implementation of IT in 
Organizations 
Information Technology affects the corporate culture and especially the 
organizational structure in a variety of ways. The introduction of information systems 
may significantly be affected by national patterns of culture. Company patterns for using 
technology can be explained in part by analyzing how white-collar workers have acquired 
a professional sense of self-awareness. Naturally, this differs depending on the country or 
region being examined, but there does seem to be a pattern linking the relationship 
between blue and while-collar workers and how Information Technology is implemented. 
7
 Dr. Caren Siehl, Lecture (at the American Graduate School of International Management 1995.) 
8
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B.        IDENTIFYING THE REASONS AND FACTORS WHICH CREATED THE 
MAJOR OBSTACLES 
1. Personal Fears Associated with Organizational Changes 
Organizational changes generate personal fears that make people resistant to the 
changes. The cost of change is the losses employees anticipate as a result of changes. The 
most frequent personal fears are the following: 
Fear of loosing once control or power 
Fear of loosing identity 
Fear of loosing competence 
Fear of loosing relationships 
Fear of loosing rewards9 
2. Possible Disadvantages of Implementing Information Technology 
Although information systems clearly alter and benefit organizations in various 
ways, the implementation of Information Technology can also create disadvantages. 
Many of the fears revolve around the feeling that computers are replacing human 
relationships, are making the company life technology oriented and thereby, dry and 
boring or that the appearance of networks and the increasing level of interactions over 
them might fragment and dismember the organization, its identity and eventually its 
existence 
The impression of losing power can affect anyone at any level of the organization. 
For example, heads of organizations are often older than Information Technology and are 
either forced to comprehensively train and acquire theoretical and conceptual knowledge 
or to shift the responsibility onto the shoulders of an expert and face the resulting loss of 
power and authority. At the department head level, each head often tries to protect his 
9
 Michael A .Beer: Leading Changes Harvard Business Research, 1988. 
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department's data. By using Information Technology, however, each has access to 
common data and can compare his results with those of others. Many view the resulting 
loss of privacy to be akin to a loss of power. Additionally, much of the workforce's 
traditional roles has been challenged and redefined. Many suffer an identity crisis and 
believe that Information Technology will reduce their autonomy, although the opposite 
often occurs.10 
Many other fears exist concerning Information Technology. One of the most 
common is losing one's basic position in the organization if one fails to adapt to the new 
technology Additionally, the use of certain forms of information systems, such as the 
computer, allows upper management to access workers private data, and easily monitor 
their work performance, giving some individuals the sense of being spied upon. Others 
find computers to be dehumanizing, leading to automation and a lack of opportunity for 
creativity. Some feel that they are pinned to the screen and are not really communicating 
with others on the basic level that humans require. Finally, the introduction of any 
automated, computerized process leads to the fear that one's job can be in jeopardy and 
that an individual is in danger of being replaced by a machine, which furthers the 
potentially dehumanizing effect of computerization.11 
Another potential negative aspect of Information Systems Technology is that its 
arrival at an organization often leads to increased internal politics. Groups that feel 
threatened by Information Technology will often entrench against its deployment, or at 
least put forth plans for a reduced deployment, while other groups that are their political 
10
 Dr. Caren Siehl, Lecture (at the American Graduate School of International Management 1995). 
11
 Dr. Caren Siehl, Lecture (at the American Graduate School of International Management 1995). 
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rivals or adversaries will respond by carrying on a strong campaign in favor of its 
installation. The result of this in-fighting is usually that when IT is finally deployed, it is 
seldom a system that is best suited for the organization's needs, but rather is the one that 
the winning faction proposed. Additionally, some departments or managers will see new 
Information Technology as a chance to increase their own power base within the 
organization by controlling the new system. In this case, the given department will 
volunteer to take charge of the system, often claiming expertise that it really does not 
have. After the fact, the workers in the department must struggle along to cope with this 
new system, unable to request additional resources without the risk of exposing their 
deception and both they and the organization as a whole, suffer for it.12 
Mistakes and technical problems occurred during the implementation process in 
the described environment, do not pose any great difficulties, nor do they precipitate 
long-term disadvantages. As people become more and more familiar with Information 
Technology and adapt to the changes it brings about, these problems will disappear, most 
likely within only a few years after the inception of any new Information Technology. On 
the other hand, psychological obstacles, such as the mind-set that insists on printed 
communication or the quality of working life, are far more difficult to overcome. 
3. The Hungarian Environment for Implementation  of Information 
Technology 
The first Soviet-made computer in Hungary was installed at the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences in December 1959. The very first Western-made computer was set 
up at the Ministry of Heavy Industry four years later. In 1975, the Coordinating 
12
 Dr. Caren Siehl, Lecture (at the American Graduate School of International Management 1995). 
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Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)13 closed the door on the 
importing of large capacity computers and parts. These restrictions have been relaxed 
only in the middle of the 1990's. The Hungarian market is still strongly PC-oriented. 
In practical terms, there is no mainframe experience and skills available in 
Hungary because, with only few exceptions, the country skipped the mainframe period. 
Companies started to build their local area networks and distributed databases in the early 
1990's. The role of system integration is growing on the domestic computer market and 
on the Information Technology market in general. Customers today are no longer looking 
for separate hardware and software, but for Information Technology solutions. 
The level of skill and education, as well as the motivation of IT experts, is high. 
There are many well-trained, experienced people in Hungary, but because of the booming 
IT industry and the temptation of working abroad, it can sometimes be difficult to hire the 
right employee with specialist knowledge for the military. In Hungary, the military 
personnel are underpaid when compared to the same level in the civilian workforce. One 
of the major problems of any IT implementation in the Hungarian military was dealing 
with the shortage of highly skilled military IT personnel. The military education system 
could not keep up with the booming industrial changes and could not meet the emerged 
human resource requirement. The military IT workforce was skilled and educated enough 
but their education was civilian oriented. There was an intellectual gap between the 
military IT demand and the civilian IT personnel supply. The mutual misunderstanding 
13
 A committee consisting of representatives from all NATO countries except Iceland that, between 
1949 and 1994, coordinated policies restricting exports of products of potential strategic value to the former 
Soviet Union and certain other countries. 
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between them is still one of the major obstacles in any IT implementation in the 
Hungarian military. 
Another problem was the changed patterns of information sharing within and 
among military organizations. In the past, organizations have had formal systems of 
record keeping and of responsibilities of information distribution. Much of the 
information was contained within an organization in a formal hierarchy. However, the 
spread of personally held information was largely dictated by social acquaintance and 
physical proximity. As a result, poorly connected or distant employees have been unable 
to take advantage of the expertise and experience that existed within the organization. On 
the other hand, the data were transferred in the form of formal reports through the inert 
bureaucratic system with low accuracy. In the past, without any functioning military 
planning system, these data could meet the requirement of bureaucratic needs and satisfy 
the military management. 
The largest problem appeared when attempting to provide data for the DRMM 
system in the Hungarian military. 
In the Hungarian military in the early 1990's, different organizations started to 
modernize their data collecting and storing systems. These efforts were separate, not 
coordinated and mostly based on personal initiatives of people who were interested in 
computer technology, and purchased a personal computer for their own purposes and 
acquired basic computer knowledge through self-education. As a result, the information 
processed  and  stored  by  using  IT was  incompatible,  unreliable,  and the  senior 
management did not consider any perspectives to this method. The information flow 
among the military organizations continued to operate using an old paper-deliver system. 
39 
In the units where data did exist, they were not always centrally accessible. The 
old reporting system was not able to satisfy the newly emerged organizational needs. The 
military management had been implementing a new, but still paper-based reporting 
system in the middle of the 1990's, when the DRMM implementation started. As a result 
of the already undertaken steps at reorganization of the Hungarian military structure, new 
structural levels appeared. These new levels often did not fit o the new structure because 
of the lack of a centralized vision and reorganization concepts. So, the different structural 
levels directly requested the units to provide data in a large variety of forms of reports, 
and put an additional burden on the subordinated management and confused them. Lack 
of staff continuity also affected the availability of data. 
Units were also not always easily able to provide accurate data on topics which 
were not seen as falling within their sphere of interest nor do they always have the human 
and financial resources available to prepare compounded data sets, such as those that 
were required to accurately analyze and process data. Producing compound data sets and 
providing accurate data about the assets, personnel, readiness, and mission capability was 
in fact a problem for the management of units. The organizations often did not have the 
staff, did not have the knowledge and did not have much experience with local data 
collection. 
C.       POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Summarizing the reasons for the failure of the implementation of the Defense 
Resource Management Model, it is apparent that they can be divided into the following 
three major groups: 
• There was an inefficient data collecting and reporting system in the 
Hungarian Defense Forces 
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• The reasons were embedded in the Hungarian military environment: 
Societal, traditional, cultural, psychological and economical factors 
• The linear approach to the problem solving of American software designer 
experts and their inability to recognize the complexity of Hungarian 
military environment 
Using the outcomes of analyzing the complex situation, this thesis provides 
possible solutions to overcome the described problems and suggests actions to take in 
order to avoid the similar implementation failures and waste of resources from aid 
programs in the future. 
1. Inefficient Data Collecting and Reporting System 
The Defense Resource Management Model (DRMM), as well as other data 
processing systems, needs correct and exact input information. Without precise data on 
the input, the output information would be false, and the defense resource analyses 
become useless. Before implementing the DRMM, it is necessary to establish a properly 
functioning data collecting and reporting system. It requires human resources and 
adequately planned and built Information Technology system, for example, a unified 
database. 
One of the possible solutions is to build a centrally operated and maintained 
database, which includes the overall and timely information about the military system. 
Possibly the most important problem to solve is to define what the stored data means. 
This work is often more complicated than the technical construction of a database. 
According to the needs of the defense resource planning process, the gathered data should 
indicate the major military categories, such as mission capability of the units and assets in 
particular, human resources, stockpiles, maintenance capability and financial resources. 
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The design of any database system should follow the normal relational database 
design requirements: 
• Each piece of information should be entered and updated in only one place 
in the system 
• The table keys should identify each table record in a unique way 
• Information should not be unnecessarily repeated 
• Basic keys should reflect reality and not be "invented" 
All the data processing departments at different structural levels of the military 
hierarchy should have the same structure, the same equipment and should operate by the 
same regulations and directives. A possible organizational structure for the Data 
collecting and processing departments is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Multi-user Information Collection Systems. 
The top-level leadership of the national defense organizations or MOD or DOD, 
must issue a powerful regulation in order to establish an overall data collecting and 
reporting system. The regulation should clearly define the rights and responsibilities of 
organizations and individuals dealing with data collecting, data processing and reporting. 
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The regulation should also determine the access or restrictions to the data of different 
commanding levels and individuals. There must be explicitly listed the kids of data for 
each commanding level and unit that can be used for operational and planning purposes. 
Collection of additional data to the list must be prohibited. The enforcement of this order 
should be strictly controlled. 
2. Societal, Traditional, Psychological and Economical Factors 
The second major area that needs to be prepared before the implementation of a 
strategic plan is the environment. Before the implementation of an IT tool, especially one 
designed for the military, it is necessary to examine the military environment. By 
exploring the organization's external and internal environment, it is possible to identify 
the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) the organization faces. 
Implementation of the Defense Resource Management Model can be seen as a 
change in the organization's strategy. The strategic issue is to improve the nation's 
military planning procedure, to make it effective, efficient, NATO-compatible, suitable 
for civil control and transparent to the public. 
Strategic issues typically concerned how the organization (what is inside) 
relates to the larger environment it inhabits (what is outside). Every 
effective strategy will take advantage of strengths and opportunities at the 
same time it minimizes or overcomes the weaknesses and threats.14 
In the Hungarian case, the implementation could not reach its strategic goal. To 
identify the reasons for that, are embedded in the Hungarian military and societal 
environment.    This thesis recommends using the Roberts'  Organizational Systems 
14John M.Bryson, Strategic Planning for Nonprofit Organizations 1995, p. 83. 
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Framework15 as a solution to this problem. See Figure 7. This model describes how the 
organization works in order to obtain their strategic goals, and offers a methodology to 
intervene if the outcomes are not satisfactory. 
As earlier shown in this thesis, the Hungarian DRMM implementation case was 
used as an example for these analyses, and the Design Factors and the System Direction 
were appropriately set. However, this thesis suggests that the DRMM department must be 
an independent organization under civilian control, although the DRMM team members 
have to have a military background or experience. If the appropriate workforce is 
available in the private sector, it is affordable to outsource the Defense Resource 
Management Modeling to a privet contractor. 
According to the model, the reasons for the failure have to be related to the 
environment context and to the culture. 
3. Environmental Context 
Among the factors along with the environment, the research found that political 
factors are one of the causes for the failure of implementing the DRMM. 
Senior management must be committed to the strategic goals and must be 
involved in the process. Without the willingness of senior management to implement 
changes, the strategic goals cannot be reached. In the Hungarian case, the political will to 
implement changes in the defense resource management appeared as a result of 
influences from the outside environment, and without the commitment of the senior 
management to the strategic goals. 
15
 Nancy Roberts, Organizational Systems Framework, NPS 2001. 
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Figure 7. Organizational Systems Framework. 
The heart of the problem is in senior and middle management support. The 
resource management processes of any organization are established from the top down. 
Change is also only successfully instituted from the top down. It is likely that DRMM 
fails to be incorporated where the desire to use the type of resource management that 
DRMM supports is not backed at the highest levels of the organization and then 
promoted and supported in each successive lower layer of management.16 
16
 Jim Wilson (Assistant Director Cost Analysis and Research Division Institute for Defense Analyses 
DoD)., letter to the author in 2001. 
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The Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) only works as a top-down 
commitment based on a senior management vision of a new way to manage the allocation 
of resources. Forcing that commitment and vision through each successive layer of 
management is critical to implementation. PPBS does not take like a virus spreading from 
low level infection to the rest of the organization. To make it happen, there must be a 
system of accountability to the highest levels to report on implementation progress. The 
people put their work emphasis on the things that their bosses are actively holding them 
accountable for. Without top level, continuing accountability, changes in something as 
fundamental as instituting a new resource management philosophy do not happen.17 
4. Culture 
Presumably, the culture inside the organization and the culture of the society are 
the main drivers for strategic management. As the Organizational Systems Framework 
shows, the culture as a filter stands between the design factors and the outputs and 
outcomes. In these analyses, the societal, traditional, psychological and economical 
factors subordinated to the culture are considered. How these factors interrelate to the 
culture and influence the behavior of the people are also examined. 
Before the implementation-intervention in the strategy starts, it is important to 
analyze and understand the cultural environment. Without deep and careful analyses of 
cultural backgrounds a factor inside the implementation process that can generate 
significant uncertainty is not addressed. As Bryson says: 
Because an organization's culture can place severe limits on its ability to 
perceive the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) as 
17
 Jim Wilson (Assistant Director Cost Analysis and Research Division Institute for Defense Analyses 
DoD)., letter to the author in 2001. 
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well as constraint possible strategic responses, an analyzes of the culture 
may be particularly useful.18 
The corporate culture is a part of the culture of the society, which permanently 
interrelates with each other. The corporate culture through the societal culture reflects the 
influence of traditions, of economy and derives the mindset of the people and the so 
called workplace psychology. Wilson demonstrates in his letter, how the workplace 
psychology works, and how the mindset of the people could affect their behavior in the 
implementation of a strategic plan:19 
PPBS involves a re-distribution of information and power in an organization. 
Even if no one loses power, power is shared because information is shared. Those who 
previously could "direct" resource uses where they wanted to, now find that they cannot 
make as many of these directives unilaterally. For example, senior budget personnel resist 
the DRMM as strongly as anyone in the organization because they would lose a large 
measure of control over where resources are used. 
PPBS results in increased accountability for resource use and people resist being 
accountable. 
The culture as a significant driver of the implementation success should be 
analyzed to learn and counted on in the strategic planning process. To be familiar with 
the local corporal culture helps to understand the needs of the environment of the 
implementation, and makes the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) 
the implementation faces more predictable. It is not realistic to alter the given culture of 
18
 Bryson, Strategic Planning for Nonprofit Organizations 1995 p. 102. 
19
 Jim Wilson (Assistant Director Cost Analysis and Research Division Institute for Defense Analyses 
DoD)., letter to the author in 2001. 
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the environment. It can, however, be influenced, and partly changed for a long period of 
time. Any attempt to intervene or alter the culture could generate a strong negative affect 
on the success of the strategic management. 
5. The Linear Approach to Problem Solving of American Software 
Designer Experts 
Every system operates well in its own environment. The environment creates the 
system and the system cannot exist without its roots. A system be it political, 
organizational or technical cannot be linearly imported to a different place without 
reproducing its original environment. The technical environment could be reproduced 
easily, but it more difficult in the case of a transferring political or organizational system. 
Also, the people's mindset reflects its own mental and cultural background in the world. 
The people are inclined to expect or assume to meet mental, cultural and 
organizational systems similar to which they are accustomed. It comes from human 
nature and it does not cause any confusion in people's everyday life. On the other hand, 
these phenomena can generate problems if this mindset affects international actions and 
reactions. 
The DRMM designer team consists of high-ranking retired military officers and 
DoD officials with a high level of knowledge and great military experience. The DRMM 
software designers made an excellent product and during the implementation process 
they did their best. The only thing they failed to learn about was the military environment 
in which their product was  supposed to be implemented.  The program structure 
sometimes reflected the designers' mindset assuming a properly functioning military 
bureaucracy in the background. If the designers would have known more about the nature 
of the machine bureaucracy of the former socialist countries, they could have shaped the 
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DRMM to be more acceptable to senior military management and more easy understood 
by military personnel. 
This thesis suggests careful learning about all the components of the environment 
where the strategic issue is supposed to be implemented before the tasks are defined and 
the structure and the technology are set. 
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VI.    CONCLUSIONS 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
Foreign aid belongs to the taxpayers, and the people in charge of its spending are 
responsible for the effectiveness of the projects. The aid is useful for the country helped 
and also for the country giving the aid if the projects reach their strategic goals. 
Otherwise, the goals turn into a waste of resources. 
B. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO AVOID THIS SITUATION IN THE 
FUTURE 
The appropriate organizations have to prepare the aid projects more carefully in 
order to obtain the strategic goals. The planners have to employ strategic management 
experts to discuss the issues and set the strategic goals. 
The environment of implementation has to be carefully examined before the 
action starts. Using the results of analyses, the expert groups have to find the answers to 
the following questions: 
Does the recipient country really need the kind of help the project is 
about? 
Does the recipient country accept the project? 
Who are the people we are dealing with? 
Is the leadership of the recipient country willing to cooperate in the 
implementation? 
What are the opposing forces? 
What are the reasons for the opposition? 
Which cultural factors can generate opposition? 
How could the cultural constraints be handled? 
Is the project prepared according to the needs of the recipient country? 
What amendments should be done to the project before it starts? 
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• What is the probability of obtaining successful outcomes? 
• According to answers to the previous questions, is it reasonable to start the 
project or not? 
C.        SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis analyzed the political, organizational and cultural barriers to the 
implementation of the U.S. Defense Resource Management Model (DRMM) by the 
Ministry of Defense in Hungary between 1995 and 2000. The thesis found the following 
reasons for these difficulties: 
• There was inefficient data collecting and reporting system in the 
Hungarian Defense Forces 
• The reasons, which were embedded in the Hungarian military 
environment, are societal, traditional, cultural, psychological and 
economical factors 
• The linear approach to problem solving by the American software 
designer experts, and their inability to recognize the complexity of the 
Hungarian military environment 
The thesis suggests the following possible solutions to avoid these difficulties of 




Before implementing the DRMM, it is necessary to build a properly 
functioning data collecting and reporting system, and create a unified 
database 
The thesis suggests that the DRMM department must be an independent 
organization under civilian control, although the DRMM team members 
have to have a military background or experience. It is possible to 
outsource the operation of the Defense Resource Management Model to a 
private contractor 
Senior management must be committed to the strategic goals and must be 
involved in the process 
Before the implementation starts it is necessary to analyze and understand 
the cultural environment 
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This thesis suggests that it is necessary to learn carefully all components of the 
environment for the future implementation of a project, prior to the tasks being defined 
and the structure and the technology are set. 
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